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Early teams: The impact of team demography on 
VC financing and going public 
Christine M. Beckman, M. Diane Burton, Charles O'Reilly 
Abstract 
This study investigates how top management team (TMT) demographic characteristics 
affect firm outcomes for young high technology firms in Silicon Valley. We study how 
team composition and turnover shape an entrepreneurial firm's ability to attract venture 
capital and its ability to successfully complete an initial public offering. We find that 
broad access to information by virtue of having top management team members that have 
worked for many different employers (diverse prior company affiliations) and have 
diverse prior experiences (functional diversity) tend to be associated with positive 
outcomes. In addition, entrants to and founder exits from the TMT increase the likelihood 
that a firm achieves an IPO. TMT exits, in turn, reduce the likelihood of achieving an 
IPO. Results also suggest that prior human capital experience is consistently associated 
with positive firm outcomes. These findings suggest that team experiences, composition 
and turnover are all important for bringing new insights to the firm and are associated 
with the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firm will succeed. 
1. Executive summary 
In this paper, we extend our understanding of the relationship between entrepreneurial 
teams and firm outcomes. Using a sample of 161 high technology firms in Silicon Valley, 
we look at the impact of founding and early top management team (TMT) composition on 
important entrepreneurial milestones. We examine two specific measures of new venture 
success: the ability to attract venture capital (VC), and the ability to successfully complete 
an initial public offering (IPO). In developing our arguments, we go beyond human capital 
explanations of teams and also consider group composition and turnover on teams as 
important predictors of new venture success. The key independent variables (functional 
diversity, background affiliations, and turnover) capture a team's ability to gather new 
information and experience that will allow the firm to be successful. We look at these 
variables longitudinally to understand how the benefits of particular types of experience 
change over time. Although both founding teams and TMTs are important, rarely have 
they been examined together. 
Consistent with prior research, we expect that both founding and early TMTs with 
diverse functional backgrounds and relevant human capital will be able to reach 
entrepreneurial milestones more quickly than less diverse and less experienced teams. 
We find that functional diversity and prior executive experience generally aids teams in 
securing venture capital and obtaining an IPO. Prior start-up experience, in contrast, has a 
negative relationship with firm outcomes in three of the four specifications. 
In addition to examining traditional functional diversity, we develop the concept of 
background affiliation — a new kind of team demographic characteristic — that may be 
particularly relevant for the success of young firms. Managers bring a good deal of tacit 
knowledge with them from their prior firms about how to organize and manage work 
processes, and this knowledge is likely to differ even between two firms in a similar 
industry. We look at two aspects of a team's background affiliations based on prior 
company affiliations (that is, the companies in which the team member's worked before 
joining the firm). We examine affiliation diversity (i.e., how many unique companies the 
team members have worked for) and affiliation overlap (i.e., proportion of prior past 
company experiences at the same company). In general, we find that firms whose top 
management teams have affiliation diversity are more likely to be successful than firms 
with fewer company affiliations. Contrary to expectations, affiliation overlap only has a 
positive effect on going public for founding teams. 
While traditional TMT demography examines tenure diversity, we are able to unpack 
tenure heterogeneity and conduct a fine-grained analysis of team entrances and exits. This 
decomposition of turnover allows us to understand the mechanisms by which turnover 
and tenure heterogeneity matter. We find that TMT departures are detrimental to a firm's 
rate of IPO; whereas founder exits and team entrances increase the firm's likelihood of 
going public. This implies that in entrepreneurial firms, tenure heterogeneity which arises 
from additions to the team (i.e., growth) and founder departures may be beneficial. 
In summary, our research suggests that both prior company affiliations and functional 
experience are important correlates of success. Firms with experienced team members 
from a range of companies will be successful more quickly than other firms. Replacing 
founders with experienced executives that have diverse functional backgrounds and 
affiliations is associated with firm success. These findings point to the importance of 
decomposing turnover to differentiate entrances from exits. They also highlight the need to 
understand both the "what" and the "where" of prior team experience. In sum, 
entrepreneurial teams are complex combinations of experiences and affiliations that have 
substantive effects on firm outcomes. 
2. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in studying entrepreneurial top management teams. This 
interest stems in part from the recognition that team founded ventures are often more 
successful than those founded by solo entrepreneurs (Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Roberts, 
1991). Entrepreneurship scholars and theorists further acknowledge that the skills and 
capabilities required of the team members who lead entrepreneurial firms change over 
time; thus, new team members need to be brought in and founders whose skills have 
become outmoded need to be replaced (Rubenson and Gupta, 1996; Boeker and Wiltbank, 
2005). This pervasive "firm life cycle" perspective on entrepreneurship — with its 
associated executive turnover — make understanding the impact of top management team 
(TMT) and founding team characteristics and composition on firm outcomes an important 
theoretical and empirical endeavor. In this paper we use and extend techniques from 
organizational demography to enhance our understanding of how team composition and 
turnover, in both the founding team and later TMTs, impact entrepreneurial firm 
performance. In contrast to the existing literature that examines either founding teams or 
TMTs at a fixed point in time, we examine both simultaneously and over time. 
For more than 25 years, organizational demography has been the dominant paradigm 
for studying top management teams (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1990). It is widely accepted that in order to successfully run a firm, the TMT 
must collectively possess the requisite knowledge and insight to make informed decisions 
about the strategic direction of the firm, and the team must coordinate and integrate to 
implement strategic decisions (Hitt et al., 2001). Organizational researchers increasingly 
use a demographic lens to link the structure and functioning of senior management groups 
to firm outcomes (e.g., Boone et al., 2004; Carpenter et al., 2004). In fact, the past two 
decades has seen an explosion in research exploring how the composition or demography 
of groups may affect group process and performance. As Williams and O'Reilly (1998) 
report, over 40 empirical studies have examined the effects of TMT demography on firm 
outcomes, team dynamics and firm. 
Entrepreneurial research has begun to address how the compositional characteristics 
of founding teams affect performance (Amason et al., 2006; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhovcn, 1990; Chandler et al., 2005; Chowdhury, 2005; Roure and Maidique, 
1986; Watson et al., 2003). However, most scholars draw upon human capital theories 
and study characteristics such as the type and amount of prior experience present on a 
team (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Schefczyk 
and Gerpott, 2000; Burton et al., 2002; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Demographic 
arguments are importantly distinct from human capital arguments in that demography 
theorizes about team composition and diversity in addition to the existence of any 
particular experience. 
An essential feature of the organizational demography approach is that it considers both 
the average characteristics of a collective as well as the differences across individuals. The 
theoretical underpinnings of organizational demography typically rely on one or two 
substantive traditions to explain the advantages and disadvantages of demographic 
heterogeneity. Some scholars draw upon classic social psychological theories and emphasize 
group dynamics and interpersonal processes (see Williams and O'Reilly, 1998, for a review). 
Others draw upon sociological theories and emphasize social network correlates of 
demography (see Hoang and Antoncic, 2003, for a review of networks and entrepreneur-
ship). As Reagans et al. (2004) articulate, there are "optimistic" and "pessimistic" views of 
heterogeneity in both traditions. In the pessimistic psychological view heterogeneity is 
problematic because it disrupts group processes and produces interpersonal conflict. 
Similarly, in the pessimistic sociological view, there is a lack of social closure and trust. In 
contrast, optimists of both psychological and sociological persuasions emphasize the 
information advantages of heterogeneity. Demographic heterogeneity brings together 
people with different skills, experiences, and social ties and is advantageous because it 
expands network resources and provides more and better information. 
Among the scholars who apply organizational demographic theories to entrepreneurial 
settings, most have focused on a group dynamics interpretation of heterogeneity 
hypothesizing (but then often failing to find) negative consequences of diversity (e.g., 
Ensley et al., 2002; Watson et al., 2003; Chowdhury, 2005; Chandler et al., 2005). We find 
this emphasis to be somewhat surprising. Given the voluntary nature of participation in an 
entrepreneurial venture, one might expect fewer problems associated with interpersonal 
relations or group dynamics. In large established firms, internal promotion systems and 
bureaucratic politics can influence who occupies an executive position leaving incumbent 
executives with minimal voice in the choice of and little influence over the actions of their 
executive counterparts. In contrast, entrepreneurial TMTs are often deeply involved in the 
choice of prospective team members. Because founders decide to band together and 
subsequent new TMT members both choose to join and are also chosen by their peer 
incumbents, the interpersonal chemistry should be much less problematic in entrepre-
neurial settings than in established firm settings. 
The limited attention to the informational benefits of demographic heterogeneity — 
beyond human capital effects — in the current entrepreneurial demography literature is 
also somewhat surprising given the long standing recognition that access to information 
and resources is one of the key factors associated with entrepreneurial success (e.g., Birley, 
1985; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). In this paper we follow Reagans et al. (2004) and 
recognize that both group processes and information access are important to firms, but we 
argue that in entrepreneurial teams the benefits of diversity likely outweigh the drawbacks. 
In this longitudinal study of entrepreneurial team composition, we examine those 
compositional characteristics that allow firms to obtain information benefits (functional 
heterogeneity, background affiliations, and turnover). We examine which effects are most 
salient for the founding team and how the effects change as the new venture matures. 
Founding teams are important because founding team characteristics impact organiza-
tional structure and performance (Kimberly, 1979; Boeker, 1988; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhovcn, 1990; Baron et al., 1996). Furthermore, reports in the business press as 
well as academic research note that venture capital firms pay particular attention to the 
strengths and weaknesses of founding team when deciding whether to fund a new venture 
(Goslin and Barge, 1986; Heileman, 1997; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Yet, it is also 
often suggested that as entrepreneurial firms evolve and mature they need to attract people 
with different skills (Aldrich, 1999; Boeker and Karichalil, 2002). As firms grow and age, 
founders are likely to be replaced with experienced executives, particularly in VC backed 
firms (Hcllmann and Puri, 2002). Thus, entrepreneurial teams are likely, as a matter of 
course, to experience compositional changes as new executive team members are added 
and as others are replaced. The importance of particular characteristics may change, and 
thus we examine both teams over time. Importantly, instead of relying on aggregate 
measures of tenure heterogeneity as is often the case, with a longitudinal research design it 
is possible to study both entrances and exits (Ucbasaran et al., 2003) and assess their 
relative impact (Chandler et al., 2005). Doing so begins to identify whether it is more 
advantageous to begin with a large, functionally diverse team or to add people and 
capabilities over time. 
We examine a traditional team demographic characteristic, functional heterogeneity, as 
well as a new kind of demographic characteristic — background affiliation — that may be 
particularly relevant for the success of young firms. Managers bring a good deal of tacit 
knowledge with them from their prior firms, about how to organize and manage work 
processes, and this knowledge is likely to differ even between two firms in a similar 
industry. We examine these characteristics for founding teams and subsequent TMTs and 
estimate their impact on achieving important firm outcomes. 
New venture success can be measured in a myriad of ways, but we emphasize two 
specific measures: the ability to attract venture capital (VC), and the ability to successfully 
complete an initial public offering (IPO). We argue that founding teams and TMTs with 
the requisite variety of skills and experience are more likely to capture the interest and 
attention of professional investors and go public. VC and IPO are important markers of 
success because ties to venture capital investors increase a firm's chances of survival 
(Shane and Stuart, 2002). The IPO is also crucial for investors since it represents an 
opportunity to earn a return on their investment, and venture capitalists encourage firms to 
quickly go public as soon as they anticipate favorable valuations (Freeman, 1999). Recent 
studies have treated both of these outcomes as measures of firm success (Welbourae and 
Cyr, 1999; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Burton et al., 2002; Shane and Stuart, 2002). In 
addition, in our context — high technology firms in Silicon Valley during the 1990s — 
these were both salient and desirable outcomes for entrepreneurs to achieve as quickly as 
possible. In addition to being established in the literature and appropriate for our context, 
both VC financing and IPO attainment have the additional advantage of allowing us to 
examine outcomes across multiple high technology industries (e.g., semiconductors and 
biotechnology), that have very different profiles on traditional financial metrics such as 
revenues and return on assets. 
3. Top management team demography and organizational outcomes 
We begin, building on the distinction offered by Foo et al. (2005), by exploring task-
related diversity. It is relatively uncontroversial to claim that human capital, both in terms 
of education and experience, is associated with superior firm performance. Entrepreneur-
ship scholars have demonstrated that the quality of the team's past experience benefits 
their firm (i.e., Burton et al., 2002; Chandler and Hanks, 1998; Schefczyk and Gerpott, 
2000). Translating these insights into a demographic framework implies studying the 
variation in type of human capital experience on the team. We concentrate on functional 
experience. 
3.1. Functional diversity 
The general argument made for the positive impact of functional heterogeneity on firm 
performance is that having diversity in functional backgrounds ensures that the TMT has 
the full range of skills and abilities needed to manage the organization (e.g., Keck, 1997; 
Randcl and Jaussi, 2003). This argument is also consistent with Roure and Keeley's (1990) 
study of new ventures that reported team "completeness" (the degree to which key 
positions were staffed by members of the founding team—was associated with firm 
success. Having broad functional experience represented on the team also makes a firm 
more attractive to external stakeholders and to investors. It signals that the management 
team has the requisite skills and capabilities to make the firm successful, profitable, and 
thereby a worthwhile investment). Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis for both 
founding teams and TMT teams: 
Hypothesis 1. Teams with higher levels of functional diversity are more likely to reach 
critical entrepreneurial firm milestones than teams with less functional diversity. 
3.2. Background affiliation: prior company diversity and prior company overlap 
Social capital refers to the benefits a firm can receive from its networks and 
memberships (Adlcr and Kwon, 2002). Many studies point to broad information access 
as an important determinant of firm success, and demonstrate that a team's social ties give a 
firm access to information and influence that can help it obtain important resources (Aldrich 
and Zimmer, 1986; Stuart et al., 1999). For instance, firms with direct or indirect ties to 
investors are more likely to receive VC funding (Shane and Stuart, 2002). This type of 
social capital is seen as a "bridge" because it focuses on the linkages of the team to external 
organizations and experiences (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Firms also benefit from "bonding" 
social capital where internal group ties facilitate cooperative relationships (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). Thus, to succeed, entrepreneurial teams need both bridging and bonding 
social capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Weisz ct al., 2004). 
We conceptualize career histories as an important vehicle by which individuals accrue 
the bonding and bridging social capital that is likely to enhance venture performance. 
Team members bring a set of experiences and contacts from prior jobs that can benefit the 
new firm (Burton ct al., 2002). In particular, an affiliation with a previous employer (what 
we term background affiliation) is, like a network or membership, an important source of 
social capital. Research has examined the benefit of working together previously 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990), and of having worked in a prominent company 
(Burton et al., 2002). Aggregated to the team-level, background affiliation is a type of 
demographic characteristic that has been rarely explored. 
More than functional heterogeneity, a diverse set of prior affiliations (affiliation diversity) 
suggests access to different networks and contacts. In entrepreneurial settings, as in other 
settings, contacts with others in the industry and financial community are positively 
associated with a firm's valuation at IPO and access to VC (Burton et al., 2002; Higgins and 
Gulati, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999). The more affiliation diversity of the team, the greater its 
range of experience and contacts, and this should help firms be more successful in both 
attracting VC and achieving IPO. Affiliation diversity should both increase the direct and 
indirect contacts that can be utilized as well as increase the unique insights and knowledge of 
the firm about how to reach these milestones (Burt, 1992; Smith et al., 2005). 
Although affiliation diversity may give a team access to unique knowledge and 
contacts, firms need access to internal or "bonding" social capital. Cohesive teams, an 
indicator of internal social capital, improve performance in new ventures (Ensley et al., 
2002). We argue that teams who have affiliation overlap (i.e., having worked for the same 
firm) may be able to communicate effectively with each other and have a common frame 
of reference, especially since these individuals have chosen to work together in the new 
venture. Founding team members who worked together before appear to be more effective 
and have greater trust (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Roure and Maidique, 1986), 
and trust is an important component of social capital (Coleman, 1988). These common 
work experiences may increase the likelihood that individuals have similar priorities and 
vocabularies and has been shown to affect the development of common beliefs and 
cultures (Chattopadhay ct al., 1999). With affiliation overlap, the internal network is likely 
to be stronger, with straightforward discussions and a clear sense of appropriate actions. 
This should signal competency to investors and allow the team to move quickly and 
efficiently. Thus affiliation diversity and affiliation overlap, in both the TMT and founding 
team, should aid firms in achieving their milestones, albeit for different reasons. 
Hypothesis 2. Firms whose teams have affiliation diversity are more likely to reach critical 
entrepreneurial firm milestones than firms whose teams have fewer diverse affiliations. 
Hypothesis 3. Firms whose team members have affiliation overlap are more likely to 
reach critical firm milestones than firms whose teams have fewer overlapping affiliations. 
It is important to note that it is possible to have both affiliation diversity and overlap. A 
useful analogy is academic colleagues who have the same graduate training (overlap), 
pursue independent academic careers (diversity), and then collaborate on a project. Their 
collaboration is enhanced by the common training, but their broader career experiences 
bring new and more resources to the collaboration. 
3.3. Tenure heterogeneity and TMT turnover 
In the extant TMT demography literature, tenure heterogeneity is often treated as an 
important demographic characteristic. The logic of the theoretical arguments applied to 
this type of heterogeneity parallels the logic outlined above: people who enter 
organizations at different times bring different frames of reference, have few shared 
common experiences, and have ties to different people and thus access to different 
information. Some research suggests that when team members leave and new team 
members arrive, communication becomes more difficult (Zcnger and Lawrence, 1989; 
Smith ct al., 1994). Likewise, O'Reilly et al. (1993) reported increased team tenure 
homogeneity was associated with trust and cooperation. Other research suggests that 
TMT tenure heterogeneity is associated with a firm adapting and learning (Wiersema 
and BanteK 1992). The effect of tenure heterogeneity is hypothesized to be negative 
when the potential conflict in group dynamics outweighs the information benefits from 
different perspectives. Interestingly, the relationship between tenure heterogeneity and 
outcomes has produced conflicting findings (Riordan. 2000; Williams and O'Reilly, 
1998). 
Understanding tenure heterogeneity is particularly important in entrepreneurial 
settings as it offers insight into one of the persistent problems of entrepreneurial firm 
development, namely, how the TMT should evolve as the firm evolves. The potential 
disadvantage of tenure heterogeneity has been shown to depend crucially on the 
environmental context (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). For instance, under stable 
conditions long-tenured teams might have an advantage because teams with experience 
together operate more effectively and easily, while in turbulent or changing conditions 
more tenure heterogeneity could be advantageous because firms can learn from new 
team members (Murray, 1989). Keck (1997), in a study of 74 TMTs in the cement and 
minicomputer industries, found that heterogeneity in the tenure of the senior team was 
positively associated with financial performance of firms during periods of turbulence 
and change, while homogeneity was associated with performance during periods of 
stability. This finding is echoed in other studies of TMT demography and change (Keck 
and Tushman, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; Sorensen, 1999). Tenure 
heterogeneity may be an opportunity for learning in turbulent environments; yet, one 
of the challenges of studying tenure heterogeneity is that it is difficult to tell whether 
changes are due to additions to the team or departures from the team, or some 
combination. 
Rather than focus on tenure heterogeneity per se, we first acknowledge that tenure 
heterogeneity is a consequence of TMT turnover. Thus, an examination of the actual 
contributions to tenure heterogeneity—entrances and exits—should illuminate the 
process and also enhance our ability to interpret the effects of tenure heterogeneity. 
While new members joining the TMT may disrupt group process and distract the team 
from their responsibilities as they socialize the newcomer (Chandler et al., 2005), we 
argue the potential benefits of new team members outweigh the potential problems. In 
an entrepreneurial setting the new hire is likely to be carefully vetted by the incumbents 
and also voluntarily joining a situation that he or she sees as compatible. Furthermore, 
additions to the TMT provide the primary vehicle for adding skills, capabilities, and 
information. Thus, additions to the TMT should aid the firm by both signaling 
competence to underwriters and providing knowledge and insights that help the firm 
grow in appropriate ways (Higgins and Gulati, 2006). 
In contrast, although a poorly performing team member is likely to cause disruption 
and have a negative impact, losing team members is likely to decrease rates of going 
public and receiving VC. Replacing a team member requires a significant amount of 
time in terms of deciding how to handle the situation and the potential operational loss 
of an executive without a ready replacement. Although it has been argued that it is 
often the worst performing executives that leave and thus their exit should help the 
firm, Chandler et al. (2005) do not find that exits increase performance. Instead, it is 
possible that high quality executive members move on to better opportunities and thus 
are significant losses for the firm. The loss may signal that the firm has some internal 
problems, and executive exit may cause disruptions to the group process that slow the 
firm's ability to meet its targets. We believe that the benefits of the new resources 
brought by an additional team member should outweigh any minor disruption; whereas 
losses should be problematic. This is consistent with a contingency argument where it 
is in turbulent environments (and entrepreneurial environments are often turbulent) that 
there are benefits for turnover because firms need to learn and adapt to change. 
Entrances are an important part of that ability to learn and adapt. Thus we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4. Firms with TMT entrances are more likely to reach critical entrepreneurial 
firm milestones than firms with fewer executive entrances. 
Hypothesis 5. Firms that lose team members will be less likely to reach critical 
entrepreneurial firm milestones than firms with fewer team losses. 
4. Data and methods 
Firms in this sample are part of a longitudinal study of 161 young high-technology 
firms at risk of going public (i.e., independent, private firms) in California's Silicon 
Valley. The focus on firms within a single region allows us to hold constant key labor 
market and environmental conditions. Within the region, we focused on industries 
engaged in computer hardware and/or software, telecommunications (including 
networking equipment), medical and biological technologies, and semiconductors. 
Rather than focusing on a specific industry, as has often been the case (e.g., Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhovcn, 1990), a wide range of industries allows us to talk about top 
management and founding teams more generally. The research project required firms in 
the study to have at least 10 employees when sampled and be no more than 10 years old 
(Certo ct al., 2001, similarly use 10 years as their cutoff for new ventures). 18 firms 
were founded by solo entrepreneurs. These firms were included in the analysis; however, 
results are similar when these firms are dropped from the analysis. Firms were first 
interviewed in 1994-95, with about half of the firms founded before 1989. Interview, 
survey, and archival methods were used to gather data on these companies (For details, 
see Baron ct al., 1999). 
4.I. Dependent variables 
Obtaining VC funding and going public together represent the most significant 
milestones in the life of a young start-up firm (Shane and Stuart, 2002). From a variety of 
public and proprietary sources (see Hcllmann and Puri, 2002), we coded whether and 
when the founding team received any amount of money from a venture capitalist. The 
firms were tracked until they ceased to be independent companies or until the end of 2000. 
Of these 161 firms, 87 firms (54%) went public and 118 firms (73%) obtained VC funding 
during our sampling period (the end of 2000). About half of the IPOs occurred before 
1995 and as early as 1987. Altogether, 48 firms exited the risk set before the end of 2000 
via acquisition, merger or death. 
4.2. Independent variables 
The key independent variables were derived from TMT member career histories. We 
constructed a database of every founder and every executive who ever held the role of 
vice president or higher (e.g., Wagner et al., 1984; Keck and Tushman, 1993). It is 
important to note that our definition of founders and managers is different from the 
traditional one employed in the entrepreneurship literature. We rely on the job title to 
determine whether a person is a member of a team. We do not know whether the 
person held equity in the venture. We used a variety of sources including business 
plans and promotional documents as well as LexislNexis, Dow Jones Interactive, 
Edgar Archives, and The San Jose Mercury News archives. Because some of our team 
data may be incomplete, we control for variables that may impact the completeness of 
the data (i.e., firm size and amount of team data collected by firm). Our final database 
contains information on 1744 executives and provides reliable team level data for 149 
firm founding teams and 151 firm top management teams. We collected a mean of 
2.69 positions for each team member, including employer identity and job title which 
provide the input for our background affiliation and functional diversity measures. 
From these individual career histories, we created the team level measures described 
below. 
4.2.1. Functional diversity 
Prior functional experience is based on the team member's previous three jobs. We 
found similar results with the team members' most recent job and all available past 
positions. We used an entropy-based measure of heterogeneity appropriate for categorical 
variables (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992). The Shannon index is calculated as — J^P,- (In 
P(), for i= 1 to JC, where x is the number of categories and Pt is the proportion of team 
members with experience in category /. The index accounts for how team members are 
distributed across possible functional categories. Diversity is maximized when all groups 
are present in equal proportions. We used five functional categories (sales and marketing, 
administrative support functions, manufacturing, science or engineering, and finance). We 
calculate functional diversity for each monthly spell for the TMT and use the founding 
team's initial functional diversity for the founding team. We set functional diversity equal 
to zero for teams of one. 
4.2.2. Background affiliation 
Affiliation diversity is measured as a count of unique prior companies for which the 
team has worked. We consider up to three prior firms for each team member and then 
sum across all team members. Some founders had no prior experience as they became 
entrepreneurs directly out of school. To calculate affiliation overlap, we coded up to three 
prior firms for which each team member had worked. We calculated the Herfindahl index 
(HHI) using the total number of unique firms for all team members; HHI is calculated as 
]T)P/, for i = 1 to x, where JC is the number of unique firms and Pt is the proportion of 
team members that worked for firm /. The HHI gives us a measure of the extent to which 
team members had overlapping prior experience. It is important to note that two team 
members can share an affiliation even if they did not work in the organization at the 
same time. Both measures are calculated at founding and then updated monthly for the 
TMT. 
4.2.3. Turnover 
In constructing our longitudinal database of top managers we were careful to note 
both start and leave dates for each person who ever held a TMT position. Start dates are 
quite reliable since firms typically issued a press release when a new TMT member 
joined. Leave dates are a bit more problematic since they are rarely announced; 
however, when successors were announced we inferred the departure date of the 
predecessor to be the month prior to the arrival of a replacement. From this we calculate 
monthly counts of TMT entrances, TMT departures, and founder departures. We 
distinguish founders from later TMT members for two reasons. First, members of the 
founding team were not always TMT members; nevertheless, they are theoretically 
important. Second, we expect the departure of a founder to have a different impact on 
the firm than the departure of a later hire. Often founders would leave the day-to-day 
operations of the firm and remain on the board; however for the purposes of this study, 
we coded such changes as exits. TMT departures include founder exits when the 
founders held an executive title. 
4.3. Control variables 
4.3.1. Team controls 
We control for team size, prior experience, and tenure. First, we calculate founding 
team size from the interviews and validated the information from archival sources. 
Second, from both the interviews and archival sources, we coded whether the team 
member had prior start-up experience (e.g., the person was a founder of a previous firm) 
and whether the team member had prior senior management experience (vice-president 
or higher rank). Both types of experience contribute to the team's human capital stock 
and should benefit the firms (Schefczyk and Gerpott, 2000; Burton et al., 2002). Third, 
the mean and standard deviation for team tenure — typical measures of tenure diversity 
in demographic research — were computed for the TMT for each team month, so the 
average TMT tenure was 40.3 months (3.4 years) and the average tenure heterogeneity 
was 11 months. The founding team variables are time-invariant, and TMT variables are 
updated. 
4.3.2. Firm controls 
We controlled for firm size, industry, VC funding, and the amount of team data 
collected for each firm. Intuitively, large firms may have more resources, improved access 
to venture capital networks, and a greater ability to go public. Firm size is measured as the 
number of employees at the end of a given year and is updated yearly. Second, we control 
for industry to capture differences in the ability of firms to obtain financing and go public 
(some industries are more likely to get funding and go public than others). We examined 
the effect of all the industry dummy variables and found the medical-related industry 
(including medical devices and biotechnology) to be the only significantly different 
industry. Third, it is well established that firms with venture capital financing are more 
likely to go public (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Shane and Stuart, 2002). In 
addition VC-backed firms are likely to have more and more diverse experience (Bruno and 
Tycbjcc, 1985; Florin, 2005). Thus, we control for the presence of venture capital in all 
IPO analyses. In the results reported here, we control for the first VC investment but 
results are similar when including a counter variable for the number of VC rounds 
received. Finally, we control for the amount of team data collected by firm. Because we 
collect our career history data via archives, there is a potential for an inadvertent bias in 
our data where we have systematically less information about the career histories of 
executives who are from firms that receive less media coverage. In order to control for 
these firm-level effects on the quality of our career history data, we include a control 
variable that represents the average number of prior positions per person collected for each 
firm. 
4.3.3. Industry level venture capital funding and IPOs 
In order to control for differences in the macro environment we also include control 
variables that capture annual variations by industry in the amount of venture capital 
financing and the number of IPOs. 
5. Analysis 
Because we have both constant, yearly time-varying and monthly time-varying 
explanatory variables, we structured our data so that we have an observation (spell) for 
each month from the firm's birth. This is a standard method of spell splitting that allows 
covariate values to be updated (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995). Although this increases the 
number of spells to be analyzed, the underlying information (the number of events and 
total observation time) is the same. Firms remain in the sample until the event of interest, 
VC funding or an IPO, occurs. Firms that persist as private companies over the entire 
observation period (through December 2000) are considered censored. Firms drop out of 
the sample if they cease to exist as independent entities either through failure, merger or 
acquisition. 
We use event-history analysis and report Cox proportional hazards models estimated by 
Stata 9.0 using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors clustered by 
firm (Lin and Wei, 1989). We report exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios); thus, 
coefficients greater than one suggest the variable increases the rate of IPO or VC, and 
coefficients less than one suggest the variable decreases the rate of IPO or VC. The Cox 
proportional hazards model assumes that the hazard ratio is proportional over time, and we 
test the assumption for all of the covariates and globally for each model based on the 
generalization by Grambsch and Thcrneau (1994). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
log hazard ratio function is constant over time suggesting the Cox model is appropriate.3 
We first analyze the effect of founding team characteristics on our two outcomes of 
interest, obtaining venture capital (Table 2) and going public (Table 3). We then analyze 
the effect of TMT characteristics on the same outcomes (Tables 4 and 5). Consistent with 
prior empirical research, we examine founding and TMTs in separate analyses; however, 
comparing across the tables allows us to begin to examine the relative importance of 
founding teams versus subsequent TMTs and how the importance of experience changes 
over time. We conclude with an analysis of compositional change as the founding team 
evolves (Table 6). 
6. Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and variable correlations.4 With the exception 
of firm industry and founding team demography, all vary over time. The correlations 
between several of the variables are quite high; therefore we enter each variable of interest 
into the analysis separately to assess its independent effect. We compare model fit across 
various models, and our results are consistent and robust with and without various control 
variables. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the founding team for both dependent variables. 
Table 2 presents event history analysis for the effects of founding team on rate of venture 
capital financing. Tabic 3 presents event history analysis for the effects of founding team 
on rate of going public. Model 1 is the baseline model. We find that large firms receive 
venture capital funding at higher rates. Firms in the medical industry, with large founding 
teams, and where we collected more team-level data have higher rates of both VC funding 
and going public. Rates of going public are also higher for firms in industries with more 
IPOs. Consistent with prior research, we also find that venture capital funding increases 
the hazard of going public by at least a factor of five (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Shane 
and Stuart, 2002). 
We find only limited support for Hypothesis 1; founding teams with high functional 
diversity have higher rates of receiving venture capital funding by 37% (Model 2, Table 2). 
This finding is consistent with the oft mentioned idea that venture capitalists pay attention 
to the quality of the team. However, this effect disappears with other experience measures 
in the model. Founding team functional diversity has no impact in a firm's ability to go 
3
 The proportionality assumption does not always hold for the individual control for firm size — particularly for 
the models where venture capital is the dependent variable. However, since firm size is not of substantive interest 
and is only included as a control, and since all models pass the global test of proportionality, we proceed with the 
Cox modeling approach because it allows for straightforward interpretation of the coefficients of interest. 
4
 Founding team size equals zero when all founders have exited the firm. TMT size equals zero when no one 
holds an executive title. Generally this occurs when founders do not assign executive titles in the early days of the 
firm. 
Table 1 
Variable descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Firm size (number of employees) 
Medical industry 
Venture capital (dummy variable) 
Industry IPOs per year 
Venture capital investment per industry/year 
Average number of prior positions for team 
Size of founding team 
Size of TMT 
Founders with prior start-up experience 
Founders with prior executive experience 
FT functional diversity 
TMT prior start-up experience 
TMT prior executive experience 
TMT functional diversity 
Team entrances 
Team exits 
Founder exits 
FT diverse prior company affiliations 
FT overlapping prior company affiliations 
TMT diverse prior company affiliations 
TMT overlapping prior company affiliations 
TMT mean tenure 
TMT S.D. tenure 
55.59 
0.10 
0.49 
2.87 
934.13 
2.00 
2.84 
2.86 
0.43 
0.45 
0.33 
0.39 
1.06 
0.58 
3.40 
.70 
.33 
3.02 
0.28 
4.50 
0.22 
40.35 
11.40 
111.54 
0.30 
0.50 
3.16 
569.75 
.92 
1.72 
1.99 
0.70 
0.68 
0.45 
0.67 
1.18 
0.54 
2.64 
1.59 
.78 
1.78 
.28 
3.04 
0.22 
34.39 
15.79 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1750 
1 
1 
39 
1 
6 
12 
12 
3 
4 
1.39 
4 
8 
1.79 
18 
15 
7 
11 
1 
19 
1 
225.00 
104.94 
14,941 
15,178 
14,919 
14,809 
14,919 
14,074 
14,731 
15,178 
14,807 
14,807 
13,783 
14,807 
14,807 
14,044 
14,807 
14,807 
14,807 
14,807 
14,540 
14,540 
14,482 
14,186 
14,186 
Correlation matrix 
Variable 10 
1. Firm size (number 
of employees) 
2. Medical industry 
3. Industry IPOs 
4. Industry venture 
capital 
5. Venture capital 
6. Average number of 
prior positions for team 
7. Founding team size 
8. FT functional diversity 
9. Founders with prior 
start-up experience 
10. Founders with prior 
executive experience 
11. FT overlapping prior 
company affiliations 
12. FT diverse prior 
company affiliations 
13. TMT size 
14. TMT functional 
diversity 
1.00 
-0.08 
0.04 
0.21 
0.08 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.02 
0.09 
1.00 
0.06 
-0.05 
0.07 
0.03 
0.06 
-0.13 
-0.10 
1.00 
0.30 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.01 
1.00 
-0.03 
0.13 
-0.01 
0.08 
0.00 
1.00 
-0.08 
0.13 
0.16 
-0.14 
1.00 
-0.23 
-0.01 
0.22 
1.00 
0.35 
-0.08 
1.00 
0.21 1.00 
0.10 -0.14 -0.05 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.33 0.20 1.00 
0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.31 0.43 0.16 0.03 -0.11 1.00 
0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.31 0.16 0.50 0.20 0.37 -0.21 
0.24 
0.15 
0.12 
0.04 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.08 
-0.07 
0.35 
0.43 
-0.05 
0.08 
0.28 
0.21 
0.21 
0.43 
0.06 
0.09 
0.21 
0.21 
0.09 
-0.01 
Table 1 (continued) 
Correlation matrix 
Variable 
15. TMT prior start-up 
experience 
16. TMT prior executive 
experience 
17. TMT overlapping 
prior company 
affiliations 
18. TMT diverse prior 
company affiliations 
19. TMT mean tenure 
20. TMT S.D. tenure 
21. Team entrances 
22. Team exits 
23. Founder exits 
Variable 
12. FT diverse prior 
company affiliations 
13. TMT size 
14. TMT functional 
diversity 
15. TMT prior start-up 
experience 
16. TMT prior executive 
experience 
17. TMT overlapping 
prior company 
affiliations 
18. TMT diverse prior 
company affiliations 
19. TMT mean tenure 
20. TMT S.D. tenure 
21. Team entrances 
22. Team exits 
23. Founder exits 
1 
- 0 . 0 5 
0.18 
0.00 
0.16 
0.20 
0.28 
0.31 
0.30 
0.18 
12 
1.00 
0.14 
0.21 
0.09 
0.19 
- 0 . 1 8 
0.29 
-0 .07 
0.02 
0.07 
0.00 
0.09 
2 
0.00 
-0 .11 
-0 .06 
- 0 . 0 8 
-0 .12 
-0 .05 
-0 .14 
- 0 . 1 0 
-0 .01 
13 
1.00 
0.70 
0.25 
0.70 
0.08 
0.79 
-0 .17 
0.39 
0.83 
0.22 
0.06 
3 4 5 
- 0 . 0 4 -
- 0 . 0 2 -
- 0 . 0 7 
0.00 -
0.20 
0.08 
0.05 
0.16 
0.16 
14 
1.00 
0.29 
0.66 
- 0 . 0 6 
0.70 
- 0 . 1 8 
0.27 
0.59 
0.16 
0.04 
-0.06 
-0.07 
0.00 -
-0.07 
0.56 -
0.16 
0.10 
0.34 
0.31 
15 
1.00 
0.33 
- 0 . 0 8 
0.28 
- 0 . 1 5 
0.01 
0.19 
0.01 
- 0 . 0 3 
6 
0.06 
0.39 
-0.12 -
0.41 
-0.16 -
0.18 -
0.32 -
0.14 -
0.06 -
16 
1.00 
- 0 . 1 3 
0.72 
-0 .21 
0.32 
0.64 
0.23 
0.09 
7 
0.26 -0 .01 
0.17 0.06 
•0.33 0.10 
0.27 0.12 
•0.18 -0 .11 
•0.04 0.01 
•0.10 0.27 
0.10 0.15 
•0.11 0.25 
17 18 
1.00 
8 9 10 1 
0.15 0.55 
0.17 0.13 
0.04 - 0 . 0 9 
0.17 0.05 
- 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 1 0 -
0.01 0.00 
0.20 0.11 
0.13 0.10 
0.19 0.08 
19 20 
- 0 . 2 8 1.00 
0.06 - 0 . 2 0 1.00 
0.04 0.36 0.17 1.00 
0.02 0.65 - 0 . 0 4 0.41 
- 0 . 0 8 0.18 0.19 0.28 
- 0 . 0 0 0.01 0.14 0.12 
0.13 -
0.51 -
0.03 
0.13 -
-0.12 
0.10 • 
0.22 
0.14 
0.05 
21 
l 
1.00 
0.62 
0.37 
11 
-0.06 
-0.11 
0.38 
-0.14 
0.10 
-0.01 
0.12 
0.10 
0.07 
22 
1.00 
0.66 
public (Model 2, Tabic 3), and with human capital controls (Model 5, Table 3) the effect is 
negative (functional diversity is associated with a 61% decrease in the hazard of IPO). 
Overall, in Tables 2 and 3 we see evidence that human capital explanations (executive and 
start-up experience) are a stronger predictor of the rate of going public and receiving VC 
funding for founding teams than functional diversity. We see that executive experience on 
the founding team increases the hazard of venture capital by 33% (Table 2) and the hazard 
of IPO by 43% (Tabic 3). In Model 5 we also see that start-up experience increases the 
hazard of IPO by 45% (Tabic 3) and decreases the hazard of VC by 25% (Table 2). 
We examine Hypotheses 2 and 3 in Models 6-7 of Tables 2 and 3. We hypothesize that 
firms benefit from two different types of social capital: one that allows access to new 
Table 2 
Event history analysis: effect of founding team on venture capital financing 
Hazard ratio and standard 
Firm size 
Medical-related industry 
Industry level VC 
financing 
Average number of prior 
positions for team 
Founding team size 
Functional diversity of 
prior experience 
Prior start-up experience 
Prior senior management 
experience 
Diverse prior affiliations 
Overlapping prior 
affiliations 
Wald chi-square 
(degrees of freedom) 
errors* 
Model 1 
1.01** 
(-00) 
1.50* 
(.38) 
1.00 
(-00) 
1.16** 
(.08) 
1.06* 
(.05) 
13.74 
(5) 
Model 2 
1.01*** 
(.00) 
1.63* 
(.41) 
1.00 
(-00) 
1.16** 
(-08) 
1.03 
(-05) 
1.37* 
(-31) 
15.85 
(6) 
Model 3 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.44* 
(-37) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.19** 
(.08) 
1.06* 
(-05) 
0.86 
(-12) 
16.24 
(6) 
Model 4 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.68** 
(.42) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.12* 
(.09) 
1.05 
(.05) 
1.34** 
(.21) 
19.73 
(6) 
Model 5 
1.01** 
(00) 
1.64** 
(.41) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.18** 
(.09) 
1.03 
(.05) 
1.35 
(.34) 
.75** 
(.11) 
1.33** 
(.22) 
27.50 
(8) 
Model 6 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.50* 
(.38) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.16** 
(-09) 
1.06 
(-06) 
1.01 
(.05) 
13.76 
(6) 
Model 7 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.50* 
(-38) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.16** 
(.09) 
1.06 
(.06) 
1.00 
(.52) 
13.89 
(6) 
One-tailed tests: ***p<.0\; **/><.05; *p<A0; 'analysis of 5471 spells for 149 firms and 115 events. 
knowledge and another that improves team cohesion. In Models 6 and 7, we add variables 
measuring affiliation diversity (Model 6) and affiliation overlap (Model 7) for the 
founding team. We find no support for Hypothesis 2 for founding teams (Model 6), and we 
see modest support for Hypothesis 3 (Table 3, Model 7). Founding teams with affiliation 
overlap have almost double the rate of going public but there is no effect on receiving VC. 
However, the improvement in fit from Model 1 to Model 7 is quite small, and the effect of 
affiliation overlap wipes out the otherwise robust effect of founding team size. Overall, we 
find weak support that founding team affiliation overlap shapes firm outcomes. However, 
we see strong human capital effects. Of course, these variables capture the background of 
the original founding team. 
Next, we examine the early TMT, which often includes founders as well as others, to 
examine how TMT characteristics impact the firm's rate of VC funding (Table 4) and its 
hazard of going public (Table 5). Again, Model 1 is the baseline model. In support of 
Hypothesis 1 for the TMT, in Model 2 we find that TMT functional diversity increases the 
rate of receiving VC and going public (2.75 and 2.10 are the hazard ratios in Tables 4 and 
5). Although functional diversity becomes insignificant when controlling for senior 
management and founder experiences in Table 5, Model 4, the direction is still positive 
and the overall improvement in model fit when this variable is included is significant. We 
also find, similar to our founding team results, that TMTs with more previous senior 
management experience receive VC funding and go public at higher rates in Models 3 and 
Table 3 
Event history analysis: effect of founding team on IPO 
Hazard ratio and standard errors* 
Firm size 
Medical-related 
industry 
IPOs in industry 
Venture capital 
Average number of prior 
positions for team 
Founding team size 
Functional diversity 
of prior experience 
Prior start-up experience 
Prior senior management 
experience 
Diverse prior affiliations 
Overlapping prior affiliations 
Wald chi-square 
degrees of freedom) 
Model 1 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.85** 
(.55) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.26*** 
(2.16) 
1.55*** 
(.21) 
1.08** 
(.05) 
104.65 
(6) 
Model 2 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.74** 
(.53) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.37*** 
(2.19) 
1.54*** 
(.21) 
1.10** 
(.06) 
0.83 
(.23) 
104.20 
(7) 
Model 3 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.93*** 
(.57) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.78*** 
(2.51) 
1.54*** 
(-20) 
1.08** 
(.05) 
1.39** 
(.20) 
103.20 
(7) 
Model 4 
1.00 
(.00) 
2.16*** 
(.66) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.05*** 
(2.08) 
1.58*** 
(.22) 
1.08** 
(.05) 
1.42** 
(.25) 
96.09 
(7) 
Model 5 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.99*** 
(.62) 
1.15*** 
(.03) 
5.88*** 
(2.56) 
1.55*** 
(-21) 
1.12** 
(.06) 
.61** 
(.18) 
1.45** 
(.25) 
1.43** 
(.23) 
92.92 
(9) 
Model 6 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.93** 
(.55) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.25*** 
(2-17) 
1.53*** 
(.21) 
1.07* 
(.05) 
1.04 
(.05) 
108.79 
(7) 
Model 7 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.91*** 
(.56) 
1.14*** 
(.03) 
5.29*** 
(2.19) 
1.61*** 
(-22) 
1.04 
(.06) 
1.98* 
(.92) 
106.86 
(7) 
***p<.0\; **p<.05; *p<A0; "analysis of 11851 spells for 149 firms and 83 events. 
4. TMT previous start-up experience reduces rates of VC and IPO by 25% and 22%, 
respectively. Interestingly the effect of VC funding is weakened when we include variables 
that account for TMT composition. This result may be due to VC funding being more 
likely for high quality teams (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Florin, 2005). Consistent with 
this idea, we see that TMT functional diversity is strongly associated with an increased 
hazard of VC funding (hazard ratio of 2.75 in Model 2 and 2.52 in Model 5, Table 4). 
We consider the impact of prior background affiliation in Models 6-7 of Tables 4 and 5. 
We see that TMTs with diverse prior company affiliations receive venture capital financing 
and go public at higher rates (Model 6). The effects are consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
although their magnitude is modest indicating between a 7% and 13% increase in the 
hazard rate for each additional unique prior affiliation. Thus, it appears that top 
management teams benefit from extensive, diverse networks. We find no support for 
Hypothesis 3 (Model 7). 
Considering the overall pattern revealed in Tables 2-5, we find that initial founding 
team characteristics and those of the current TMT have similar effects on firm outcomes 
(with a few exceptions). We find partial support for Hypothesis 1, TMT (but not founding 
team) functional diversity increases the rate of obtaining milestones. We find partial 
support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 as well. We find diverse prior company affiliations aid the 
Table 4 
Event history analysis results: effect of TMT demography on venture capital financing 
Hazard ratio and standard errors* 
Firm size 
Medical-related industry 
Industry level VC financing 
Average number of prior 
positions for team 
Team size 
Functional diversity of 
prior experience 
Prior start-up experience 
Prior senior management 
experience 
Diverse prior affiliations 
Overlapping prior affiliations 
Wald chi-square 
(degrees of freedom) 
Model 1 
1.01** 
(-00) 
1.73** 
(.46) 
1.00 
(-00) 
1.14* 
(-08) 
1.13* 
(.10) 
11.42 
(5) 
Model 2 
1.01** 
(-00) 
1.73*** 
(.41) 
1.00 
(-00) 
1.11* 
(.08) 
0.90 
(.11) 
2.75*** 
(-73) 
32.37 
(6) 
Model 3 
1.01** 
(00) 
1.72** 
(.46) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.15* 
(-08) 
1.14* 
(.11) 
0.95 
(-16) 
12.08 
(6) 
Model 4 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.74** 
(.47) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.05 
(.08) 
0.98 
(-10) 
1.53*** 
(.21) 
23.46 
(6) 
Model 5 
1.01** 
(-00) 
1.64** 
(.41) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.09 
(08) 
0.87 
(-10) 
2.52*** 
(.71) 
.75** 
(.13) 
1.37** 
(•22) 
43.70 
(8) 
Model 6 
1.01** 
(.00) 
1.72* 
(.45) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.05 
(.09) 
1.00 
(-12) 
1.13** 
(.07) 
11.81 
(6) 
Model 7 
1.01** 
(-00) 
1.72*** 
(.45) 
1.00 
(.00) 
1.13* 
(.08) 
1.13 
(•12) 
0.92 
(.54) 
14.46 
(6) 
V<.01; **/?<.05; */?<.10; 'analysis of 5223 spells for 146 firms and 111 events. 
TMT in obtaining milestones, and overlapping prior company affiliation help the founding 
team go public. In general, the TMT appears to have more predictive power; however, the 
founding teams with affiliation overlap and prior executive experience have a lasting effect 
on the firm. 
We next turn to an analysis of turnover on the TMT and how it influences firm 
outcomes (Hypotheses 4 and 5). Because most firms obtain venture capital financing 
relatively quickly (about half of the firms receive venture capital within the first two years 
of life), turnover is best examined in the IPO context. Model 1 is the baseline model that 
examines how turnover on the TMT and founding team impacts the rate at which firms go 
public. Because the extent of turnover depends on the size of the teams, we control for the 
size of the founding team in all models and find a weak positive impact on the rate of 
going public. 
The underlying reasoning for tenure effects in the demography literature is that turnover 
brings in new experiences and insights, as well as disturbs group process. In order to 
assess the impact of turnover, above and beyond the changes that turnover brings to 
functional diversity on the team, we control for TMT functional diversity in all models.5 In 
Model 2 of Tabic 6, we mirror previous research and examine mean TMT tenure and 
5
 Our results hold without functional diversity in the model. They are also consistent if we use prior executive 
experience as the key human capital control. 
Table 5 
Event history analysis results: effect of TMT demography on IPO 
Hazard ratio and standard errors* 
Firm size 
Medical-related industry 
IPOs in Industry 
Venture capital 
Average number of prior 
positions for team 
Team size 
Functional diversity of 
prior experience 
Prior start-up experience 
Prior senior management 
experience 
Diverse prior affiliations 
Overlapping prior affiliations 
Wald chi-square 
(degrees of freedom) 
Model 1 
1.00* 
(.00) 
4.93*** 
(1-45) 
1.18*** 
(-03) 
2.42*** 
(1.07) 
2.38*** 
(-34) 
1.86*** 
(-01) 
192.39 
(6) 
Model 2 
1.00* 
(.00) 
4.76*** 
(1.39) 
1.18*** 
(-03) 
1.88* 
(-85) 
2.43*** 
(-37) 
1.74*** 
(.12) 
2.10** 
(.82) 
211.62 
(7) 
Model 3 
1.00* 
(00) 
5.18*** 
(1.45) 
1.17*** 
(.03) 
2.18** 
(i.oi) 
2.46*** 
(.33) 
1.91*** 
(.11) 
0.79* 
(.13) 
196.13 
(7) 
Model 4 
1.00* 
(-00) 
5.49*** 
(1-61) 
1.16*** 
(.03) 
2.26** 
(.94) 
2.20*** 
(.35) 
1.63*** 
(-12) 
1.29*** 
(.11) 
236.16 
(7) 
Model 5 
1.00* 
(.00) 
5.57*** 
(1.56) 
1.16*** 
(.03) 
1.81* 
(.84) 
2.32*** 
(.35) 
1.64*** 
(.14) 
1.39 
(.57) 
.78* 
(.12) 
1.26*** 
(.11) 
260.69 
(9) 
Model 6 
1.00* 
(.00) 
5.15*** 
(1.47) 
1.17*** 
(.03) 
2.27** 
(.99) 
2.16*** 
(.36) 
1.71*** 
(-15) 
1.07* 
(.05) 
212.26 
(7) 
Model 7 
1.00* 
(.00) 
4.98*** 
(1-42) 
1.17*** 
(-03) 
2.35** 
(1.03) 
2.28*** 
(.37) 
1.83*** 
(.11) 
0.35 
(.53) 
202.15 
(7) 
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.\0; 'analyses based on 11977 spells for 151 firms and 84 events. 
tenure heterogeneity. We see that firms go public faster when they have teams with shorter 
tenure and with more tenure heterogeneity. This is consistent with prior research in 
turbulent contexts. However, the precise meaning of these findings is quite difficult to 
interpret as both the mean and standard deviation are changed by both additions to and 
departures from the team. 
Model 3 shows support for Hypothesis 4; TMT entrances increase the rate of going 
public by 32% for each entrant to the firm. In order to examine Hypothesis 5, we entered 
founder exits into the model in Model 4. Contrary to Hypothesis 5 but consistent with the 
expectation in Chandler et al. (2005), we find that founder turnover and TMT turnover 
increase the rate of going public. However, when TMT entrances are also included in the 
model, TMT exits decrease the rate of IPO. The increase in model fit suggests that once the 
effects of replacement are accounted for, TMT exits decrease the rate of going public by 
34%, as expected in Hypothesis 5. Model 6 suggests that TMT entrances and founder exits 
increase the rate of going public by 69% and 25%, respectively, but TMT exits decrease 
the rate of going public by 34%. Rather than overall turnover being beneficial or 
detrimental to the firm, we see that entrances and founder exits assist firms in obtaining 
IPO faster and TMT exits are detrimental to the firm. We thus find support for Hypothesis 
4 and partial support for Hypothesis 5 (TMT exits but not founder exits are detrimental to 
Table 6 
Event history analysis results: effect of team turnover on IPO* 
Hazard ratio and standard errors 
Firm size 
Medical-related 
industry 
IPOs in Industry 
Venture capital 
financing 
Average number 
of prior positions 
for team 
Founding team size 
TMT functional 
diversity 
Mean TMT tenure 
SD TMT tenure 
Total entrants 
Founder exits 
Total exits 
Diverse prior 
affiliations 
Overlapping prior 
affiliations 
Wald chi-square 
(degrees of freedom) 
Model 1 
1.00 
(.00) 
2.46*** 
(.71) 
1.15*** 
(.03) 
1.91* 
(-78) 
1.70*** 
(.27) 
1.05* 
(.04) 
11.59*** 
(4.02) 
147.73 
(7) 
Model 2 
1.00 
(-00) 
2.37*** 
(-64) 
1.15*** 
(.03) 
2.12** 
(.77) 
1.79*** 
(-28) 
1.06* 
(.05) 
8.24*** 
(2.80) 
98*** 
(.01) 
1.03*** 
(-01) 
141.56 
(9) 
Model 3 
1.00 
(.00) 
4.42*** 
(1.32) 
1.15*** 
(-03) 
1.82* 
(-74) 
2.18*** 
(.36) 
1.02* 
(-04) 
5.03*** 
(1-84) 
1.32*** 
(.06) 
209.20 
(8) 
Model 4 
1.00 
(-00) 
2.57*** 
(-75) 
1.15*** 
(.03) 
1.97* 
(-81) 
1.69*** 
(-27) 
1.02* 
(.05) 
11.77** 
(4.08) 
1.24** 
(-15) 
146.99 
(8) 
Model 5 
1.00 
(.00) 
2.76*** 
(.81) 
1.15*** 
(-03) 
1.91* 
(-77) 
1.75*** 
(.28) 
1.04* 
(.04) 
11.65*** 
(4.06) 
1.13*** 
(-05) 
152.19 
(8) 
Model 6 
1.00 
(00) 
5.90*** 
(1.81) 
1.15*** 
(.03) 
1.84* 
(-79) 
1.91*** 
(.37) 
0.99 
(.05) 
1.77* 
(.73) 
1.43*** 
(.142 
1.318*** 
(.14) 
0.76*** 
(.07) 
245.60 
(11) 
Model 7 
1.00 
(.00) 
5.71*** 
(1.73) 
j 14*** 
(.03) 
1.76* 
(.76) 
2.03*** 
(-38) 
1.00 
(.05) 
1.88* 
(.76) 
1.52*** 
(.12) 
1.22** 
(.14) 
.71*** 
(.06) 
1.10** 
(.05) 
238.46 
(11) 
Model 8 
1.00 
(.00) 
5.59*** 
(1.68) 
1.16*** 
(-03) 
1.70* 
(-72) 
2.22*** 
(-40) 
0.98 
(.05) 
2.29** 
(.88) 
1.67*** 
(-11) 
1.24** 
(.14) 
.66*** 
(.07) 
0.39 
(.61) 
230.53 
(11) 
***p<.0\; **p<.05; */?<.10; "Analyses based on 11916 spells for 150 firms and 84 events. 
the firm). We find that TMT entrance is the most important factor increasing the ability to 
attain IPO with the hazard rate increasing by 43-69% for each entrant. 
In Models 7 and 8, we add the background affiliation measures. TMT turnover has 
independent effects on rate of IPO, over and above the effect of TMT functional 
diversity and background affiliation. The hazard ratios are consistent with Table 5 
(supporting Hypothesis 1, 2, 4, and partial support for Hypothesis 5 for TMT effects on 
rate of IPO). 
We also performed supplementary analyses to ensure that our models have causality 
correct: teams predict firm outcomes. It is also possible that firms change their teams in 
order to look more attractive to venture capitalists, or that firms change their teams in 
anticipation of going public. Certainly we expect some of this reverse causality to be true 
as well. However, we wanted to ensure that our results are not merely "window-dressing" 
where firms are altering their teams only to increase the chances of reaching one of these 
important milestones. We conducted all of the analyses with the spells in the year prior to 
IPO or VC funding dropped from the models. We find substantively similar results even 
when the year prior is ignored, suggesting our results are not about anticipating venture 
capital funding or going public. We also looked at yearly spell files and found similar 
results.6 Taken together, these models give us confidence as to the causality and 
significance of our findings. The results are consistent across dependent variables, types of 
teams (founding and TMT), and alternative model specifications. 
7. Discussion 
Overall, we find team composition, human capital and social capital to have consistent 
and generally positive effects on the likelihood of entrepreneurial start-ups attracting 
venture capital and going public. In general, we find that adding knowledge and 
experience (functional heterogeneity, prior management experience, affiliation diversity, 
and team entrances) help the firm obtain VC and go public. These effects are stronger for 
the TMT than the founding team but we see generally consistent effects across the two 
teams. The major exception is that for founding teams, overlapping prior company 
affiliations are helpful for going public; but, for top management teams, diverse prior 
company affiliations are helpful. 
Empirically, the study has two contributions. First, background affiliation has been 
rarely examined in the literature. Second, we are able to decompose turnover into 
entrances, founder exits, and team exits. We see that firms benefit from adding TMT 
members and founder exits, but general team exits slow the rate of IPO. This suggests that 
growth is an important issue for new ventures trying to go public. It is those firms that 
continued to grow and expand (with diverse team members) while losing some of their 
founders that were able to go public more quickly. There are costs to making poor choices 
in these new hires — since firms experience lower hazards of IPO when they have 
turnover among non-founder executives. Importantly, through our additional analyses, we 
confirmed that this effect is not simply a reflection of the fact that successful firms are 
more likely to add senior managers in preparation for going public. 
In addition, prior executive experience increases the rate of both VC and going public, 
and prior start-up experience decreases the rate of both outcomes. The only exception is 
that start-up experience on the founding team increases the rate of IPO. This may be 
because, for those firms that do not receive venture capital, founders need more start-up 
experience. 
Importantly, the compositional variables associated with skills and capabilities— 
functional diversity, prior senior management experience —- are more important correlates 
of firm success than the social capital variables. There is a large difference in the size of 
the effects with the background affiliation variables contributing to a 10% increase in the 
hazard and TMT functional diversity more than doubling the hazard rate of VC and 
increasing the hazard of IPO no less than 77%. These findings extend and refine previous 
Founder and TMT exits, however, are not significant in the yearly models. 
research, confirming that the human capital of the founding team and TMT may usefully 
predict entrepreneurial success. 
For entrepreneurship research, our work adds background affiliation as an 
experience that should be considered. We also contribute to the growing interest in 
understanding turnover in new ventures (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Chandler ct al., 
2005). The question of whether entrances and exits (founder and more generally) are 
helpful to the firm are answered with strong effects in our models. More research 
remains to be done examining the reasons for and skills of those leaving the firm. This 
will further elucidate whether it is indeed the benefits of information outweighing the 
costs of disrupted group dynamics that are driving these effects. Also, by examining 
both the founding and top management teams, we can see that it is the TMT that 
increases the rate of reaching milestones more than the founding team; however, this 
paper does not explore how the founding team also shapes the recruitment of later 
managers (Beckman and Burton, 2005). Thus we may understate the importance of the 
founding team. 
For social network research, this paper offers background affiliation as a way to 
operationalize social capital that is both new and unique. Most social network research has 
focused on direct ties or structural equivalence (Burt, 1992). Here we focus on a "tie" that 
may not be a direct tie at all. A prior affiliation captures a set of norms and expectations 
about how to organize work, but two individuals from the same organization may share 
those expectations without having ever worked or even met each other. Social capital 
refers to the goodwill available as a result of the social structure and does not require direct 
social relations (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Shared prior affiliations can generate trust, and 
diverse prior affiliations can generate contacts and new insights. Thus, we point to another 
means by which bridging and bonding social capital can be developed and understood. 
Much organizational ecology research rests on an assumption that senior management 
teams are resistant to change or lack the capabilities to adapt, although no measures of this 
construct are ever provided (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Sorensen, 1999). The roots of 
this inertia are sometimes attributed to a process of "imprinting" that occurs at founding 
(Bockcr, 1988). The results of the study reported here move one step closer to 
understanding how and why inertia may operate. Based on the demographic composition 
of the group, easily and objectively measured, it appears that characteristics of the 
founding team may affect both the relevant skills and experiences available to the firm as 
well as the ability of the group to access and use these capabilities. However, in contrast to 
ecological predictions, our research also indicates that a firm is not doomed to failure if the 
founding team does not have the relevant past experience. The TMT, which evolves over 
time, has a stronger impact on firm outcomes. 
Although our results are remarkably consistent across teams and firm outcomes, several 
of our findings were contrary to our expectations. The consistency of these results leads us 
to believe these contrary effects are not anomalies but findings worth exploration and 
consideration. Three of these findings are notable and suggestive of future research. First, 
we find a counterintuitive result for the founder exit: it increases the rate of going public. 
This may be because it is those founders that exit are the poorest performers (Chandler et 
al., 2005). In examining the data in more detail, it appears that firms with venture capital 
backing are those that benefit from founder exit. Second, we find that the strong influence 
of venture capital backing on the rate of going public is dampened when the demographic 
characteristics of the TMT are controlled which suggests venture capital may be critical 
because of how venture capitalists alter the team. Third, functional diversity on the 
founding team may depress the rates of going public but it increases the rates for the TMT. 
This may be because we are capturing those diverse founding teams that do not receive 
venture capital. All these findings suggest that the relationship between VC backing and 
team make-up should be examined. 
We also find unexpected results in our social capital analyses. Contrary to Roure and 
Maidiquc (1986), we find limited evidence that founding teams with affiliation overlap go 
public faster. Instead, TMTs with more background and affiliation diversity go public 
faster. These findings are consistent with the idea that diverse knowledge benefits both 
firms and individuals (Burt, 1992). Entrepreneurial team members may share similar 
motivations for joining the team, so the deleterious effects of diversity on group process 
may be less problematic than previous research would suggest. The founders certainly, and 
to some extent the TMT, are volunteers who in many cases have chosen to work together; 
as a result, they may not face the group process difficulties captured in much of the 
demographic research. In addition, the rapid-fire nature of change among start-up 
companies may make unique and diverse insights more valuable. 
One of the unique aspects of our data is the ability to look at teams longitudinally from 
founding. We are able to take important first steps in examining the relative impact of 
founders and TMTs. Our results confirm that team composition in the early years has 
dramatic effects on the firm's ability to reach milestones, and we see the benefits of 
diversity and change. 
Of course we acknowledge the limitations of our study. The data are not as complete as 
data for more established firms, and we may have been unable to find data on TMT members 
that were not successful during their career or who have tended to work in firms that are 
media-shy. We control for the amount of data collected to address this issue, and it is the case 
that we have more data for firms that reach these milestones. Also, we are unfortunately not 
able measure team process directly. Furthermore, the personality and power of team 
members has not been captured (Pitcher and Smith, 2001). Our results, however, inform and 
are informed by process studies. By examining these issues over time we can see whether 
functional diversity, for example, has similar benefits as the team changes. Finally, our 
results are from a specific time and place. Part of our time period includes the internet boom 
times of the late 1990s (although by and large these are not internet companies). This may 
influence our results. For example, we find TMT exits decrease rates of IPO but it may be 
that in other contexts, when outside opportunities are not as prevalent, exits are useful as a 
means of eliminating managers that are not performing. In our study, however, it appears that 
firms are losing high quality TMT members. Although we imagine the process is similar in 
various contexts, future research is needed to know how much we can generalize these 
results to other times and places. 
For entrepreneurs, our study suggests that, when forming a team, diversity on multiple 
attributes should be considered (i.e., function, prior affiliation) as well as prior experience. 
Furthermore, teams should continue to grow and add experience if the firm desires to go 
public. Sustainable growth is difficult, and is not a task that can be done easily, but our 
results suggest there are pay-offs for firms that do it successfully. 
In conclusion, we find both the "what" and "where" of team member experience are 
important and we find that team growth helps firms to reach their milestones. In 
entrepreneurial firms, teams benefit from affiliations, experiences and turnover, all of 
which bring new knowledge to the firm. We are encouraged by the consistency of our 
results, how our findings contribute to and reflect current theories, and by the potential 
rewards of examining teams over time in the rich research setting of entrepreneurial 
firms. 
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